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Under-harvesting in the smallholder oil palm sector leads to substantial 
production losses amongst outgrowers.  At Hoskins losses were 
estimated at around 25% of production.  The main problems relate to 
labour supply.  
 
A payment trial at Hoskins was designed to increase the supply of labour 
and so raise productivity.  The trial was established jointly by OPRA and 
OPIC and ran for 15 months from July 2002 on LSS and VOP blocks at 
Hoskins.   
 
There was a significant increase in FFB production.  Monthly production 
for trial blocks increased from 75% of the LSS/VOP average without 
contract labour to 113% during months when contract labour was 
employed.  Productivity increased on 90% of blocks with 30% 
improving by more than 50 percentage points.  
 
In addition to productivity gains, those participating in the trial 
experienced considerable socio-economic benefits.  These included: 
 
• Utilisation of under-employed labour. 
• Improved access to labour for elderly and disabled growers. 
• Greater financial security for married sons and caretakers. 
• More equal distribution of income within households. 






BACKGROUND TO UNDER-HARVESTING 
 
 
Introduction    The oil palm industry has been expanding in recent years and 
palm oil is now the leading agricultural export commodity in 
Papua New Guinea (PNG).  In 2002, exports of palm oil 
comprised 32% of the total value of PNG’s agricultural exports, 
and 5% of the country’s exports.  In 2003, total palm oil 
production was 1,679,690 tonnes, 32.5% of which was produced 
by smallholders (545,333 tonnes), with the company estates 
producing the balance (OPRA data). Oil palm’s importance as a 
smallholder crop has been increasing steadily in recent years and 
future growth of the industry depends to a considerable extent on 
improving smallholder productivity.   
 
Smallholder oil palm productivity is below potential levels, 
particularly amongst village oil palm (VOP) producers.  Over 
five years from 1998, the productivity of Hoskins land settlement 
scheme (LSS) smallholders and village oil palm smallholders 
(VOP) has averaged respectively 60% and 38% of plantation 
levels (NBPOL data).  Research by OPRA at Popondetta, 
Hoskins and Bialla revealed that incomplete harvesting is the 
main cause of the low productivity of smallholdings (Koczberski 
et al. 2001; Koczberski & Curry 2003).  This research also 
revealed that despite the existence of a large pool of potential 
labour, especially on the LSSs, the willingness to work was 
reduced by deep doubts about payment.  This report presents the 
findings of a payment trial at Hoskins in which OPIC and 
NBPOL undertook to pay contract labour on smallholder blocks 
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and so remove much of the uncertainty of payment.  By 
guaranteeing payment of contract labour, the trial was designed 
to increase the supply of labour and so raise smallholder 
productivity.  The trial was established jointly by OPRA and 
OPIC and ran for 15 months from July 2002 on LSS and VOP 
blocks at Hoskins.   
 
Incomplete  
Harvesting  To estimate the extent of under-harvesting, post-harvest surveys 
were conducted at the Hoskins and Bialla schemes in 2002.  
They were conducted within two days following a harvest pickup 
and recorded harvesting rates (fully harvested, partially 
harvested, not harvested) from Phase 1 at the roadside edge of 
the block through to Phase 3 at the rear of the block1. 
 
We conducted surveys, with the assistance of OPIC officers, in 
May-June, 2002 at Hoskins and in June, 2002 at Bialla.  At 
Hoskins, post-harvest surveys were conducted on 249 LSS 
blocks at Buvussi, Galai, Tamba and Kapore subdivisions and on 
109 blocks on the VOP subdivisions of Gaungo and Morokea.  
At Bialla, 73 LSS blocks were surveyed at Mamota, Silanga, 
Tiaru, Wilelo, Balima, Soi and Kabaiya subdivisions, and 28 
VOP blocks at Ewasse, Gaekeke, Kai, Kiava, Lavegi, Mataururu, 
Matililiu, Noau, Sisimi and Ubai subdivisions.   
 
The Hoskins and Bialla results demonstrate considerable under-
harvesting and a very marked edge-effect in which harvesting 
rates decline from Phase 1 through to Phase 3 plantings at the 
rear of the block (Figure 1).    
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Figure 1.  Per cent of phases fully harvested for Hoskins and Bialla LSS & 
arvesting rates tend to be higher at Hoskins for all three 



























planting phases on the LSS and on Phase 1 of VOP blocks.  The 
lower harvesting rates at Bialla LSS reflect the difficulties of 
harvesting old and tall palms on the older subdivisions of Wilelo, 
Balima and Tiaru where replanting has been delayed2.  Because 
of the small number of VOP blocks in the survey with Phase 2 
plantings, it is not possible to draw any conclusions about 
differences in the harvesting potential of VOP smallholders on 
the two schemes.  It should be noted that the harvesting surveys 
were undertaken when oil palm prices were relatively high 
(K120-K130), and this may explain the higher than expected 
harvesting rates on Phase 1 of VOP blocks.  Also, the higher 
harvesting rates at Hoskins VOPs compared with Bialla VOPs 
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may reflect the larger number of ‘purchase’ blocks3 in the 
Hoskins VOPs of Gaungo and Morokea. 
 
Under-harvesting leads to substantial production losses amongst 
Constraints on 
The harvesting edge-effect reflects the impact of distance from 
 
Labour supply constraints are the main cause of under-
 
smallholders4.  At Hoskins, total annual losses of smallholder 
fruit were conservatively estimated at 60,000 tonnes per year, or 
around 25% of production for 2001.  If we assume that 
smallholder under-harvesting rates at Bialla are similar to those 
at Hoskins (a likely assumption), then in 2002, over 33,000 
tonnes of smallholder fruit were not processed by the HOPL mill.  
Thus, there is great potential to raise smallholder productivity 
and income by raising harvesting rates. 
the Supply of  
Labour  
the road on harvesting practices.  On the Hoskins and Bialla 
LSSs, less than half of Phase 3 plantings were fully harvested, 
compared with 74% and 55% of Phase 1 plantings at Hoskins 
and Bialla respectively.  The farther the fruit must be carted by 
wheelbarrow from the rear of the block, the greater the 
reluctance to harvest it.  Other factors probably compound the 
effect of distance.  These include insufficient labour or time to 
evacuate fruit from Phase 3 plantings, advanced age of grower, 
poor access (e.g., slopes, gullies, swampy ground), and lower 
maintenance at the rear of the block.  
harvesting.  Fieldwork amongst smallholders in Popondetta, 
Hoskins and Bialla revealed that the main types of constraints on 
the supply of labour were:  
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• Household labour shortages (e.g., small family size, old 
age, short and long-term illness and physical disability). 
• Under-utilisation of available household labour or 
caretaker labour due to contested tenure rights. 
• Disputes over remuneration of labour. 
• Reduced availability of household labour due to social 
commitments or competing economic activities (e.g. off-
block employment). 
• Minimal supply of hired labour.   
 
Such constraints on oil palm labour can be temporary or long-
term and result in incomplete harvesting, ‘skip’ harvesting 
(harvest rounds missed), abandonment of blocks, or 
abandonment of a portion of an oil palm block (usually at the 
rear of the block, or an old stand of oil palm awaiting replanting).  
The effects on productivity of particular types of labour 
constraints can be exacerbated by a block’s physical 
characteristics.  For example an elderly grower with no co-
resident sons to help him is much less likely to harvest old and 
tall palms than a younger, fitter grower. 
 
Labour supply constraints can be grouped into two categories: 
absolute labour shortages; and, constraints that lead to the under-
utilisation of labour.   
 
Absolute labour shortages can be long or short-term.  Long-term 
household labour shortages usually affect blocks where young 
married couples, the elderly, sick, physically disabled, or 
widowed reside, with little or no co-resident adult family labour.  
Short-term labour shortages can occur as a result of illness, 
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customary or religious obligations or short-term absences from 
the block.   
 
Families experiencing absolute labour shortages often have 
difficulty overcoming labour constraints for a range of reasons, 
such as truncated kinship or social networks that limit the pool of 
labour upon which they can draw (a problem on LSSs where 
settlers have been recruited from outside the province).  Because 
of the very limited development of a market in hired labour it is 
often difficult for families experiencing labour shortages to 
recruit hired labour.   
 
The under-utilisation of labour is common on caretaker blocks 
and on LSS blocks where married sons live with their parents 
and where the father controls the organisation and remuneration 
of oil palm labour.  On densely populated blocks5 disputes often 
emerge between father and sons and amongst brothers over the 
remuneration of oil palm labour.  Disputed remuneration 
between father and sons reflects different expectations associated 
with levels of payment for labour and young married men’s 
desire for more financial autonomy and greater control over oil 
palm income to meet their individual and household needs.  
 
The limited market in hired labour and the under-utilisation of 
household and caretaker labour result mainly from the reluctance 
of people to provide labour when there is no guarantee they will 
be paid.  Blockholders’ non-compliance with the ‘labour 
contract’ serves to curtail the supply of labour for oil palm 
harvesting and block maintenance.  Payment uncertainty for 
labour results in a great deal of under-utilised labour, particularly 
on blocks where there is a poor relationship between the 
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caretaker and owner, and on populated blocks where oil palm 
income is distributed unfairly amongst family members and co-
resident households.   
Overcoming 
Labour 
Constraints Two important points emerge from our examination of the 
constraints on the supply of labour for oil palm production: 
 
First, the limited market in hired labour is a major barrier to 
increasing smallholder production, exacerbated by payment 
uncertainty. Without guaranteed payment for work done, a large 
potential labour force in the smallholder oil palm sector is 
untapped.  
 
Second, the payment of household or caretaker labour is usually 
controlled by a single individual, the blockholder.  If the 
blockholder distributes oil palm income unfairly, the motivation 
of household members or caretakers to engage in oil palm 
production is reduced, and people redirect their labour to areas 
where they are assured a return on their labour. 
 
These constraints on the supply of labour largely result from 
ineffective payment mechanisms. Finding a solution required 
designing a system that guaranteed payment of labour.   
 
The search for a solution began with identifying the key 
principles that contributed to the success of the OPIC Lus Frut 
Mama Scheme (LFMS).  First introduced at Hoskins in 1997, the 
LFMS has been highly effective in overcoming barriers to 
women’s participation in oil palm production (Lewis 2000).  The 
payment card, known locally as the ‘Mama Card’, pays women 
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separately for the collection of loose fruit.  The key principles 
underpinning the success of the LFMS initiative include: 
 
 
1. Direct payment for women’s labour by the company.   
Low rates of loose fruit collection by women prior to the 
introduction of the Mama Card resulted from underpayment and 
lack of payment certainty for their labour spent in loose fruit 
collection.  Women relied on their husbands to remunerate them 
for loose fruit collection on the monthly paydays, but the social 
pressures on men to redistribute this oil palm income outside the 
family meant that their wives, missed out or received an amount 
less than the value of their contribution.   
 
The reluctance or inability of men to pass on some of the 
monthly oil palm income to their wives was due mainly to the 
numerous demands on oil palm income such as loan repayments, 
credit repayments at tradestores, the financial demands of 
immediate and extended family, customary obligations and the 
social pressures on men to gamble and participate in beer 
drinking parties.   
 
By paying women directly for their labour, a ‘labour contract’ 
between the company and women was able to be fulfilled, 
creating an incentive for women to collect loose fruit.  
 
2. Cashless transactions are attractive forms of payment for 
blockholders.   
Prior to the introduction of the Mama Card many men were 
reluctant or unable to hand over a share of the oil palm income to 
their wives and this caused many domestic disputes.  Since the 
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introduction of the Mama Card, most men are willing to place a 
few FFB bunches on the Mama Card which they view as their 
financial contribution to the upkeep of the household.  Other 
forms of work that women perform on the block, such as 
maintaining paths and palm circles, is often ‘paid’ for at harvest 
time by placing some FFB bunches in the Mama net.  It is much 
easier for men to give FFB than cash to their wives because 
competing claims are virtually absent.  The cashless transaction 
of the Mama Card circumvents the excessive demands on cash, 
and women are effectively guaranteed a contribution to the 
household from their husbands.  
 
3. Emergence of flexible labour practices and new payment 
arrangements.  
Following the introduction of the Mama Card, more flexible 
labour practices and payment arrangements emerged both within 
and between blocks, such as lending the card to children to pay 
school fees, and to visitors to buy travel tickets home.  It is also 
used to help relatives out of financial difficulties and to meet 
customary obligations.  The scheme has become an important 
way for women to organise their own cash and labour 
transactions with women from other blocks.  This has not only 
raised women’s social status, but has increased oil palm 
productivity as across-block co-operation in oil palm production 
rose.  The enhanced labour flexibility provided by the scheme 
increased women’s motivation to produce oil palm.  
 
By identifying the principles underlying the success of LFMS, 
we can begin to see how problems relating to ineffective 
payment mechanisms for labour may be overcome through a 





MOBILE CARD TRIAL 
 
 
The Mobile Card 
 Explained In 2002 OPRA and OPIC began a trial of a new payment 
initiative (the Mobile Card) designed to facilitate the utilisation 
of family and caretaker labour and to promote labour mobility 
between blocks (hired labour) by guaranteeing payment of 
labour.  The design principles and concepts underlying the 
Mobile Card were drawn from OPIC’s LFMS and based on 
numerous meetings and discussions with senior OPIC managers 
at Hoskins (Frank Lewis, Otto Putkin and the Divisional 
Managers).   
 
The Mobile Card worker is paid a percentage of the value of the 
fruit harvested and weighed on the Mobile Card.  The percentage 
split of the harvested crop is recorded on a contract signed by the 
blockholder and the Mobile Card labourer assigned to the work.  
Rather than being paid in cash by the blockholder, the worker is 
paid a proportion of the FFB recorded on the Mobile Card.  The 
company pays the labourer directly according to the percentage 
split agreed to by the blockholder and Mobile Card worker (for 
the trial period OPIC arranged and made payments related to 
Mobile Card production).  The payment of labour in fruit (a 
share of the fruit harvested by the worker), overcomes the 
reluctance or inability of blockholders to fulfil their part in the 
payment of labour.  Unlike existing payment arrangements, the 
Mobile Card is not tied to work on the block where the worker 
resides; it can be used as a payment mechanism on any block 
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requiring labour where a ‘labour contract’ has been signed by the 
blockholder and Mobile Card worker (hired labourer).  This 
initiative enhances labour mobility across blocks. 
 
The Mobile Card requires a signed contract agreement between 
the blockholder and the Mobile Card holder before the labourer 
can be employed.  Designed by OPIC, the contract specifies the 
type of work to be done, the phases to be harvested or 
maintained, the contract period and the agreed percentage split 
between blockholder and labourer.  A ready reckoner was 
developed to assist blockholders and Mobile Card workers to 
anticipate their earnings given a certain weight of fruit weighed 
on the Mobile Card (Table I). 
 
The anticipated benefits of the Mobile Card included: 
• Recovery of a significant proportion of the ‘lost’ fruit on 
those smallholder blocks employing Mobile Card labour. 
• Increase in smallholder production and incomes. 
• Increase in the amount of smallholder income that is 
subject to debt recovery. 
• More efficient use of existing infrastructure (roads, 
transport, milling capacity, smallholder oil palm 
plantings). 
• Less conflict over labour remuneration. 
• Extra income would make it easier for smallholders to 
undertake replanting. 
• Mobilisation of unemployed and under-employed youth, 
leading to greater social stability. 
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Papa Mobile Papa Mobile Papa Mobile Papa Mobile Papa Mobile
10% 90% 20% 80% 30% 70% 40% 60% 50% 50%
Kg harvested
50 5 45 10 40 15 35 20 30 25 25
100 10 90 20 80 30 70 40 60 50 50
200 20 180 40 160 60 140 80 120 100 100
300 30 270 60 240 90 210 120 180 150 150
400 40 360 80 320 120 280 160 240 200 200
500 50 450 100 400 150 350 200 300 250 250
600 60 540 120 480 180 420 240 360 300 300
700 70 630 140 560 210 490 280 420 350 350
800 80 720 160 640 240 560 320 480 400 400
900 90 810 180 720 270 630 360 540 450 450
Tonnes harvested
1 100 900 200 800 300 700 400 600 500 500
2 200 1800 400 1600 600 1400 800 1200 1000 1000
3 300 2700 600 2400 900 2100 1200 1800 1500 1500
4 400 3600 800 3200 1200 2800 1600 2400 2000 2000
5 500 4500 1000 4000 1500 3500 2000 3000 2500 2500
6 600 5400 1200 4800 1800 4200 2400 3600 3000 3000
7 700 6300 1400 5600 2100 4900 2800 4200 3500 3500
8 800 7200 1600 6400 2400 5600 3200 4800 4000 4000
9 900 8100 1800 7200 2700 6300 3600 5400 4500 4500
10 1000 9000 2000 8000 3000 7000 4000 6000 5000 5000
Split 1
PERCENTAGE SPLITS
Split 5Split 4Split 3Split 2
Table I.  Ready Reckoner 
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Mobile Card  
Trial  A modified weigh docket was designed by OPIC for the trial.  
Four copies of the weigh docket were made for each pickup: one 
each for the driver, the extension officer supervising the trial, the 
Mobile Card labourer and the blockholder.  OPIC arranged 
payments to blockholders and Mobile Card workers according to 
the percentage splits agreed in the contracts. 
 
An OPIC Mobile Card extension officer was employed full-time 
(funded by ACIAR) from July 2002 to December 2003 to 
supervise and monitor the trial.  The Mobile Card officer 
organised contracts between blockholders and Mobile Card 
workers, monitored contracts and dealt with problems as they 
arose.  He was also responsible for monitoring fruit pickups, 
arranging payments for blockholders and Mobile Card workers, 
carrying out post-harvest labour surveys and maintaining block 
production records.  OPRA assisted with the implementation, 
monitoring and assessment of the trial.   
 
Recruitment of low producing VOP and LSS blocks was 
undertaken in consultation with OPIC officers who identified 
blocks with the following characteristics: 
 
• Labour-short blocks with low production, including some 
with high debt levels.  
• Blocks where conflict or disagreements over labour 
payments amongst family members constrained 
production and the utilisation of household labour. 
• Blocks managed by caretakers who were experiencing 
payment difficulties and conflicts with blockholders. 
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• VOP blocks where alternative income sources such as 
fishing or other cash crop activities were taking people 
away from oil palm production. 
• Owners of multiple blocks or large oil palm holdings who 
regularly had difficulty recruiting hired labour.   
 
All blocks in the trial could be considered ‘problem’ blocks.  
Most were characterised by very low productivity, many 
experienced family conflict and some had a poor history of loan 
repayment.   
 
The following criteria were used when assessing applicants for 
Mobile Cards: 
 
• The applicant (male/female/group) had a sound 
production track record and/or was known to OPIC to be 
a hard and reliable worker. 
• The applicant had limited access to oil palm income (e.g., 
from a recently poisoned block, high population block, or 
a block where conflicts had limited the income from oil 
palm). 
• The applicant came with a recommendation from the 
OPIC Divisional Manager. 
• The applicant had access to tools and harvesting nets. 
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Mobile Card Trial  
Results  Before proceeding to a full trial of around 30 blocks, an initial 
sample of 11 blocks was selected as a pilot group to identify and 
address any problems that might arise in the main trial.  The 
information from the pilot group was then incorporated into the 
design of the main trial.   
 
The pilot group was drawn from Gaungo VOP and Sarakalok 
and Kapore LSS with ten growers joining the group between July 
and September, 2002.  Lakimata Correctional Institutional 
Services (CIS) was also included.  CIS has 17 ha of oil palm and 
productivity was low as a result of long-term difficulties 
managing harvesting labour. 
 
The pilot group of 11 blocks was made up of two blockholders 
who had contracted a co-resident son as Mobile Card workers, 
with the other nine blocks hiring off-block labour.  Of the 11 
blocks at the end of September 2002: 
 
• five contract periods were not completed (two blocks 
later signed new contracts as part of the main trial); 
• two contracts expired and were not renewed; 
• four contracts expired and were renewed (these blocks 
later signed new contracts as part of the main trial).  
 
The 11 blocks in the pilot group highlighted some problems with 
sample selection and implementation of the trial, and indicated 
why the Mobile Card worked better on some blocks than on 
others.  The most important of these problems were: 
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1. The Card was least successful on VOP blocks employing 
migrant labourers where there was a weak social 
relationship between the worker and the blockholder.  
Generally, contracts were more successful where there 
was an existing kinship relationship or close and trusting 
friendship between the blockholder and Mobile Card 
labourer.   
2. Some of the less successful VOP blocks in the trial were 
identified and recruited to the trial by the research team, 
and blockholders may have been less committed to the 
trial than those who were self-selecting.   
3. On abandoned and semi-abandoned blocks, a higher 
percentage split in favour of the Mobile Card worker was 
necessary to motivate them through the labour intensive 
phase of bringing blocks back into production (some 
workers broke their contracts after receiving their first 
payment because they believed they had been under-paid 
for their work)6.   
 
These considerations were taken into account in the sample 
selection for the main trial.  Announcements and discussions of 
the trial on the local OPIC radio program explained how the 
Mobile Card operated, the potential benefits of the Mobile Card 
and the types of blocks where such an initiative might prove 
useful.  The response to the radio programs was very positive, 
with many blockholders and potential Mobile Card labourers 
contacting OPIC to participate in the trial.  All new blocks 
joining the trial were self-selecting, often with the blockholder 
and potential Mobile Card worker contacting OPIC together to 
participate in the trial.   
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The second round of recruitment to the trial began in October 
2002 and included four blockholders from the pilot group whose 
contracts continued into the main trial period.  An additional 21 
new blocks joined the trial between October 2002 and September 
2003, as well as another two blocks from the pilot group that 
signed new contracts in this period.  The sample size reached 27 
blocks in October 2003, with 32 contracts signed (three blocks 
signed two or more contracts during the trial period).   
 
At the end of November, 2003, 18 contracts were still operating, 
two had expired, one Mobile Card worker had died and 11 
contracts had not lasted the full contract period.   
 
The results indicate that the Mobile Card trial was successful on 
several indicators.  Production increased on the majority of 
blocks; smallholders involved in the trial experienced social and 
economic gains (see below); and, no blockholders complained 
about the amount or quality of work performed by Mobile Card 
workers.   
 
One unanticipated outcome of the trial was the interest it 
generated amongst church groups.  Many church groups 
recognised the potential of the Mobile Card for fund raising, and 
seven church groups signed Mobile Card contracts.  Rather than 
relying on cash donations to fund church activities, members 
contributed FFB which was weighed on the church Mobile Card.  
Because this use of the Card simply involved a redistribution of 
FFB from growers to churches, it is unlikely that smallholder 
productivity rose amongst church members.  While undoubtedly 
yielding social benefits for the church members involved, these 
growers were not included in the 32 contracts assessed for this 
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report because the Mobile Card was not being used to overcome 
a production or labour constraint.  
Production and 
Farm Management 
Outcomes There was a significant increase in FFB production measured 
against average monthly LSS or VOP production.  Monthly 
production for trial blocks increased from 75% of the LSS/VOP 
average without the Mobile Card to 113% during months when 
Mobile Card labour was employed – a net percentage point gain 
of 38.   
 
Productivity improvements were documented for 90% of blocks 
with 30% improving by more than 50 percentage points (Table 
II).  The fact that a strong positive ‘Mobile Card effect’ was 
replicated across most blocks, suggests that the initiative is an 
effective way to raise smallholder productivity.  
 
 
Table II.  Improvement in FFB production on trial blocks using the Mobile Card. 
 Improvement in Percentage Points 
 
 No Gain 
 
>0-10 >10-50 >50 TOTAL 
No. of Blocks 
 
3 3 15 9 30* 
Per cent of Trial 
Blocks 
10 10 50 30 100 
* The 30 blocks comprise the 27 blocks in the main trial and 3 blocks with cancelled contracts in 
the pilot group (two blocks with expired contracts in the pilot group were not included in these 
calculations because it was likely they were shifting fruit between blocks).  The number of blocks 
is less than the number of contracts (32) because some blocks signed more than one contract during 
the trial period.   
 
 
The productivity gains/losses relative to the monthly average 
LSS/VOP production for individual blocks are shown in Table 
III.  Excluding the blocks that were likely to be shifting fruit 
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between blocks, the average net increment in percentage points 
was 38.66 
 
Table III.  Productivity expressed as a percentage of LSS/VOP average for 














4 LSS 1 103.3% 51.5% -51.8%  
37 VOP 5 322.2% 308.2% -14.0% Likely to be shifting fruit between blocks 
9 LSS 1 106.5% 105.6% -0.9%  
14 LSS 3 76.8% 80.3% 3.5%  
21 LSS 11 127.4% 131.1% 3.7%  
18 LSS 3 129.9% 133.9% 4.0%  
1 LSS 6 119.2% 131.6% 12.5%  
27 LSS 5 108.3% 123.8% 15.5%  
16 LSS 2 66.8% 82.6% 15.8%  
35 VOP 6 71.9% 89.8% 17.9%  
20 LSS 10 97.0% 119.6% 22.6%  
17 LSS 6 79.1% 102.5% 23.3%  
30 LSS 1 0.0% 25.5% 25.5%  
28 LSS 2 0.0% 30.3% 30.3%  
15 LSS 6 95.1% 125.8% 30.7%  
34 VOP 1 164.8% 200.0% 35.1% Likely to be shifting fruit between blocks 
31 LSS 2 41.2% 83.5% 42.4%  
19 LSS 1 106.4% 148.9% 42.6%  
8 LSS 4 108.0% 154.0% 46.0%  
13 LSS 3 57.2% 103.3% 46.1%  
32 LSS 3 15.7% 64.5% 48.8%  
7 LSS 5 3.5% 57.4% 54.0%  
12 LSS 1 95.8% 152.6% 56.8%  
3 LSS 7 95.3% 164.1% 68.7%  
2 LSS 10 12.4% 97.4% 85.0%  
11 LSS 2 131.8% 217.6% 85.9%  
38 CIS 7 18.6% 104.6% 86.0%  
36 VOP 7 30.8% 137.0% 106.2%  
33 VOP 3 128.0% 236.6% 108.5%  
22 LSS 2 73.3% 182.4% 109.1% Likely to be shifting fruit between blocks 
       
  Average 86% 124.9%   
  Average 75% 113.2% (Excluding fruit shifters) 
 
 
Productivity improvements varied by the type of relationship 
between blockholder and Mobile Card worker (Table IV).  The 
category ‘hired labour’ showed the greatest improvement, 
followed by ‘caretaker’, then ‘father-son’ relationships.  Despite 
the small number of blocks in each relationship category, the 
differences in productivity increases across the three categories 
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are sufficiently large to suggest that the type of relationship is an 
important factor influencing productivity gains.  A larger sample 
is required to test these differences conclusively.  The differences 
in productivity improvements amongst different types of 
relationships are understandable.  Levels of intra-family and 
caretaker-blockholder conflicts vary through time: a troublesome 
son moves away; caretakers are occasionally paid well; whereas, 
for labour short blocks, where labour must be recruited from off-
block, levels of labour shortages are likely to be more persistent. 
 
Table IV.  Average productivity improvement in percentage 
points by relationship between blockholder and Mobile Card 
labourer. 












* Excluded from analysis are cases where fruit shifting between blocks 
is likely. 
 
Alongside productivity increases when Mobile Card labour was 
deployed, there were other improvements to farming practices.  
These yielded longer-term productivity gains that persisted 
beyond the contract period of Mobile Card workers.  Long-term 
productivity increases were mainly the result of improved access 
to blocks (e.g., clearing of undergrowth) which raised the 
harvesting efficiency of blockholders after expiry of Mobile Card 




• Abandoned and semi-abandoned blocks brought back 
into production (Box 1). 
• Improved block maintenance (an overgrown block is 
more difficult to maintain than one that is already in good 
condition). 
• More regular harvesting. 
• Quicker loan repayments. 
 
Blocks that were carrying debt when they joined the trial made 
substantial reductions in their debt levels.  For example, CIS 
which had debts with NBPOL of K2,500 repaid its loan arrears 
in six months.  A debt of K327 on a semi-abandoned LSS block, 
managed by a widow, was cleared within a year.  This LSS block 
was in very poor condition, and prior to the Mobile Card there 
was very little prospect of the debt being serviced (Box 1).  The 
widow was subsequently granted a company loan for replanting.   
 
The most dramatic improvements in productivity were on 
abandoned or semi-abandoned blocks that were brought back 
into production by Mobile Card workers.  Plates 1a and 1b, and 
2a and 2b are ‘before’ and ‘after’ photographs of two blocks 
where Mobile Card labour was used.  The two sets of 
photographs show dramatic improvements in block condition 





Plate 1a.  Area of overgrown LSS block in Siki subdivision prior 




Plate 1b.  The same Siki block cleared by Mobile Card worker. 
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Plate 2b. The same Kapore block cleared by a Mobile Card 
husband and wife team. 
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Socio-Economic 
Outcomes The Mobile Card proved effective in conflict resolution over the 
allocation of labour and the distribution of income amongst co-
residents of blocks and in overcoming labour shortages on other 
blocks.  It generated considerable socio-economic benefits for 
the families of Mobile Card workers and blockholders hiring 
Mobile Card labour.  When the Mobile Card was successful on 
strife-ridden and dysfunctional blocks, the gain in social benefits 
for residents was much greater than for residents of blocks where 
initial problems were to do with absolute labour shortages.  
However, on some strife-ridden blocks the social problems 
proved intractable, and the Mobile Card alone was unable to 
overcome them.  Additional interventions would be required on 
such blocks to address the deep-seated problems.   
 
Table V summarises the reasons why 12 contracts were cancelled 
prematurely.  A range of family problems from the death of a 
family member to tenure disputes, led to Mobile Card contracts 
being broken, but none was due to the Mobile Card itself. 
 
For the 20 contracts that went their full term, Table VI lists the 
labour constraints on production affecting each block prior to the 
Mobile Card and the main socio-economic benefits arising from 






Table V. Mobile Card contracts cancelled between October, 2002 and November, 2003.   



















No change in block 
maintenance 
DF3 Father cancelled card after son used Mobile Card income to buy alcohol. 
Father-
adopted son  
Blockholder and 






DF Stepmother unhappy with 70% split going to adopted stepson.  Cancelled card. 
Father-son   
Blockholder ill  
46.1 
No data  Son found off-block employment. Card no longer in use.   
Caretaker  Blockholder living on another block 
 
54 
Significant improvement  History of tenure dispute & legal proceedings eventually stopped work of MC 
worker.   
Hired 
labourer (in-
law)   




DF Two contracts.  First contract, Mobile Card holder died.  Second contract,  
MC holder evicted from block because MC wife found stealing from block.  















in Mt Hagan 
 
-142 





on another block 
 
106.2 
Significant improvement  Two contracts.  First contract cancelled because MC worker unhappy with split 
due to semi-abandoned block.  Second contract, MC worker quits after 
learning that the agreed split had been changed in favour of the blockholder 







No change in block 
maintenance 
 Father cancelled card after son collected both cheques (MC and Papa cheques) 




Widower with no 
sons on block 
 
85 
Steady improvement Steady 
reduction in 
debt 
MC worker discouraged by amount of work required to bring block back into 
production, and quits. 
1.  Production for months when Mobile Card labour deployed (as a percentage of the LSS or VOP average) less the production for months without the Mobile Card 
(as a percentage of the LSS or VOP average). 
2.  Likely shifting of fruit between blocks. 
3.  DF: Debt free 




Table VI. Active and expired Mobile Card contracts at end of November, 2003.  















CIS.  Unreliable labour  
86 
Steady improvement Substantial reduction in debt and greater income for prison to maintain its operations. 
Mother-son   
Income disputes with son  
3.7 
Good block maintenance 
continued 
Greater financial independence for son and less social conflict on block. 
Father-son  
Severe disputes over oil palm income  
22.6 
Steady improvement Less social conflict on block & less financial demands on father. 
Father-son  
Elderly blockholder  
23.3 
No data Greater incentive for son to work on block. 
Hired labourer  




Steady improvement  Greater income security for blockholder and wife. 
Father-son**  




Good block maintenance 
continued 
Son has access to oil palm income while father is absent.  Later, contract renewed to help 
son. 
Father-son   




No recent data Greater incentive for son to harvest and less conflict with father. 
Father-son   
Block in son’s name  
15.5 
Good block maintenance 
continued 
Easier to share oil palm income between father and son. 
Caretaker  
Widower living in Rabaul  
25.5 
New card Increased income for blockholder and Mobile Card worker (MC worker’s block under 
replant). 
Caretaker   
Blockholder hospitalised.  No sons  
46 
Significant improvement Maintained production and income stream during illness. 
Caretaker   
Blockholder living in Rabaul  
3.5 
No recent data Greater incentive for caretaker to harvest. 
Caretaker  




Steady improvement Improved labour supply. 
Caretaker  
Blockholder living in Rabaul  
48.8 
Abandoned block back in 
production 
Increased capacity to reduce personal outstanding loan. 
Hired labourer  
Blockholder elderly & ill  
30.3 
No recent data Regular income for elderly grower. 
Hired 
labourer**  
Widower with no sons on block  
85 
Abandoned block back in 
production.   
Large increase in income and greater income security.  Repayment of long-outstanding debt 
and capacity to reinvest in block. 
Hired labourer  




Good block maintenance 
continued 
Reduced income fluctuations as a result of occasional labour shortages. 
Hired 
labourer* 




Significant improvement Increased oil palm income for blockholder and Mobile Card worker. 
Hired 
labourer*  
Temporary absence of blockholder  
4 
Good block maintenance 
continued 
Relieved problems of meeting village commitments. 
Father-son**  
Temporary absence of blockholder  
-51.8 
No change in maintenance Enabled son to access oil palm income during father’s absence.  Later, contract renewed to 
help son. 
Hired labourer 
Blockholder living on another block 106.2 Steady improvement Reduced income fluctuations as a result of labour shortages. 
1. Production for months when Mobile Card labour deployed (as a percentage of the LSS or VOP average) less the production for months without  the Mobile Card 
(as a percentage of the LSS or VOP average - see text).  
*Expired      ** Expired and renewed 
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Overall, the study identified four main sets of beneficiaries. 
 
First, on blocks where there was prolonged conflict between 
blockholders and their sons over the allocation of oil palm labour 
and income, the Mobile Card lessened conflict by giving married 
sons greater financial autonomy, while still providing an income 
for their fathers, the blockholders.   
 
On many LSS blocks a married son will contest his father’s 
control over block management and income distribution.  
Married sons are increasingly demanding that their oil palm 
labour be remunerated at market rates rather than be mediated by 
traditional cultural norms such as the in-kind payment of labour 
associated with the use of family labour.  Prior to the Mobile 
Card, these blocks suffered frequent disputes over work and 
income because blockholders resisted paying market rates for 
their sons’ labour and were reluctant to relinquish control over 
oil palm production.  Not only did a blockholder risk losing 
income if his son took over production, but his status as head of 
the block was also undermined.  In such cases, the Mobile Card 
enabled sons to generate a regular and secure income without 
undermining the social position of their fathers; the blockholders, 
in turn, were guaranteed a proportion of the income earned on 
the Mobile Card.  Whilst the productivity gains from the 
introduction of the Mobile Card on these blocks have not been as 
great as those experienced on caretaker blocks or blocks using 
Mobile Card hired labour (Table IV), the reduction in social 
conflict has created a more stable social environment for the 
production of oil palm (Box 2). 
 
Second, on blocks where prolonged illness or old age has 
curtailed productivity, the Mobile Card created a regular and 
secure income for blockholders (Box 3).  This group benefited 
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greatly from a more regular and secure income that opened up 
new opportunities for them (Box 4).  
 
Third, the situation of caretakers who previously received 
uncertain, irregular and under-payment for their work improved 
significantly with the introduction of the Mobile Card.  Because 
blockholders often have other financial commitments, or because 
they visit their caretakers infrequently, some caretakers are faced 
with a great deal of payment uncertainty.  Not surprisingly, in 
these circumstances, caretakers will pursue strategies to secure 
their incomes such as weighing fruit on a neighbour’s payment 
card.  Alternatively, they may minimise the amount of labour 
they expend in oil palm production by neglecting block 
maintenance.  In such situations, the Mobile Card provides 
caretakers with a secure and regular income from oil palm and 
thus increases their motivation to produce oil palm and maintain 
their blocks. 
 
Fourth, the families of Mobile Card workers also derived social 
benefits from the Mobile Card.  An off-block income source 
relieves social pressures arising from having insufficient income.  
This is particularly the case on highly populated blocks where 
Mobile Card workers reside.  Also, when a Mobile Card worker 
recruits family or friends to assist him, Mobile Card income is 
distributed more widely amongst the worker’s family and kin 
group.    
 
Finally, although church groups were not included in the trial, we 
cannot ignore the considerable interest of church and community 
groups in the Mobile Card trial.  The seven church groups that 
signed Mobile Card contracts reported remarkable benefits for 
their groups.  The Mobile Card helped overcome difficulties with 
fund raising, because the absence of competing demands on fruit 
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compared with cash meant it was easier for people to donate FFB 
than cash.  As one church member at Kavui explained, “moni 
igat tupela tingting [family and kin obligations/responsibilities 
vs. individual wants]: tasol bunch ino gat sampela samting tied 
long em”.  Most church groups recommended donating five 
FFBs per block on a monthly or fortnightly basis.  The monies 
raised were allocated to special church projects including 
funding a new church building, a new house for the pastor, 
hosting church conferences, and, in one case, funding 
maintenance of a school building.  The Lutheran Church at 
Buvussi raised K1,200 within a few months of signing a Mobile 
Card contract.  This enabled the church to proudly host, for the 
first time, the Lutheran Church New Guinea Islands Regional 
Conference which attracted over 100 people from neighbouring 
provinces. 
 
It is likely there was no increase in oil palm production among 
church members.  However, there is potential for the Mobile 
Card to build stronger communities and foster civil society 
through its use by church, community and sporting organisations.   
 
In summary, the range of socio-economic benefits of the Mobile 
Card for smallholders include: 
 
• Utilisation of under-employed labour on LSS and VOP blocks. 
• Greater capacity of blockholders to overcome temporary labour 
shortages due to illness or off-block commitments. 
• Improved access to labour for elderly and disabled growers. 
• Greater financial security and independence for married sons and 
caretakers. 
• More equitable distribution of oil palm income among household 
members. 
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• Less social conflict on block (fewer disruptions to oil palm 
production). 
• Strengthening of community groups and civil society. 
Factors Affecting 
the Success 
of the Trial   While the results of the Mobile Card trial indicate positive 
production and socio-economic gains, the success of the trial was 
limited by two main factors. 
 
First, unlike most on-farm research or extension trials that target 
innovative and progressive farmers, the Mobile Card trial 
targeted ‘problem’ blocks, often characterised by very low 
production or a history of highly disruptive family conflict.  The 
likelihood of success of the trial on such problem blocks was 
potentially very low.  Whilst the Mobile Card was able to 
overcome conflict and payment problems on most blocks, 
sometimes the problems were just too great for the Mobile Card 
alone to resolve.   
 
Second, because of limited resources, difficulties arose in co-
ordinating and managing the trial.  OPIC had responsibility for 
managing the trial which became more cumbersome and time-
consuming as the sample size grew.  A project-funded Mobile 
Card officer was responsible for negotiating and arranging 
contracts, supervising harvest pickups (which sometimes meant 
lengthy waits for the truck to arrive), arranging payments and 
maintaining production and debt records (payments and 
production and debt records on the other harvesting cards are 
handled by the milling company’s computer).  At times the work 
for the extension officer was overwhelming and resulted in 
delayed or incorrect payments to Mobile Card workers and 
blockholders.  The occasional late delivery of Mobile Cards for 
fruit pickups meant that fruit had to be weighed on the 
blockholder’s card, thereby creating uncertainty of payment for 
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Mobile Card workers.  At times, such problems reduced growers 
and workers’ motivation and confidence in the scheme. 
 
Case Studies   The following four case studies illustrate the various benefits derived 
from the Mobile card7. 





Widow leaseholder – Hired Labourer 
Kapore LSS block 
 
 
Block details: 6 hectares of oil palm. 
1st Phase: poisoned in 1995; replanted in 2000. 
2nd Phase: poisoned in 1995. Seedlings delivered in 2000 but not planted. 
3rd Phase: planted in 1985. 
 
First Mobile Card contract signed in August, 2002, and work began in October
2002. 
 
The leaseholder, Elizabeth, is a widow whose adult sons are living and working
elsewhere in PNG.  After the death of her husband, around 1990, Elizabeth and
her young children were harassed on the block by local youth, and experienced
many incidences of petty theft.  With constant harassment the family left the
block and accepted an offer to reside on an adjoining block where they would be
better protected.  When Elizabeth’s sons moved away for work, the harvesting
and management of the block declined, and over time Elizabeth lost interest in
the block as it became too difficult for her to maintain on her own.  Occasionally,
when Elizabeth needed extra money she would hire a youth group to harvest the
block, but without regular weeding, pruning and harvesting the condition of the
block deteriorated until it was completely overgrown.  When the Mama Lus Frut
Scheme was introduced in 1997, Elizabeth and her daughters occasionally
collected loose fruit to earn supplementary income.  However, as the condition of
the block deteriorated, the marketing of garden foods and betel nut became the
family’s primary income source.   
 
In October, 2002 when a Mobile Card worker was first employed, Elizabeth’s
block had the following characteristics: 
 
• Infestation of weeds, creepers and small shrubby trees in all three phases.   
• The oil palm seedlings planted in 2000 were overgrown with weeds and
most had not survived the neglect. 
• Most of the palms planted in 1985 had not been pruned or managed for
almost a decade. 
• Extremely low production.  Block production from January to September,
2002 was 1.19 tonnes, an average of 0.13 tonnes per month. 
• Loan repayments to the company were very slow.  In September, 2002, the
debt on the block stood at K377.  Most of this debt was related to a seedling
delivery in 2000.   
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Box 1 cont… 
 
The first Mobile Card labourer signed a contract for a 60:40 split, in his favour.
However, after two months the labourer did not return as he was discouraged by
the amount of hard work required to bring the block back into production, and he
considered that his share of the income was insufficient to compensate him
adequately for this arduous task.   
 
The second Mobile Card contract was signed in January 2003, with a 50:50 split.
The labourer, Steven, was the son of a close family friend of Elizabeth; both
families were among the original migrant settlers at Kapore.   Steven had no oil
palm block of his own and had recently become unemployed.  During his
unemployment he was dependent on his father-in-law’s oil palm block for
income where he occasionally worked.   
 
Because of the large amount of work required to bring Elizabeth’s block into
production, Steven’s wife regularly worked alongside him.  She would cart the
harvested bunches to the roadside collection point, and occasionally collect loose
fruit.  Steven’s nephew and his wife assisted occasionally with the work.  Steven
organised the labour and distributed the income among his co-workers.   
 
On this block, like several others in the trial, the blockholder and/or the Mobile
Card worker sometimes had difficulties estimating what they would earn using a
percentage split of the fruit.  If either party were disappointed with their share of
a monthly payment, often they would adopt another payment arrangement
involving the Papa Card to eliminate what they saw as an element of
unpredictability in their payments.  Often, in these arrangements, the fruit
harvested by the Mobile Card worker would be divided between the Papa and
Mobile Card nets, with 100% of fruit weighed on the Mobile Card being paid to
the worker and all the fruit weighed on the Papa card going to the blockholder.
In this way the worker and the blockholder knew exactly how much income they
would be paid.   
 
Of the ten payments made to Mobile Card workers on this block, six involved the
use of the Papa Card to distribute income between blockholder and labourer.  The
OPIC officer supervising the trial recognised that in situations where the Mobile
Card worker or blockholder had difficulty predicting their income from a
percentage split, the use of the Papa Card resolved this difficulty.  Both Elizabeth
and her Mobile Card workers found this arrangement satisfactory because their
expectations were met regarding levels of payment. 
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Box 1 cont… 
 
• The 1985 Phase 3 planting had been brought back into production, and
block             maintenance had improved dramatically. 
• Increased production from Phase 3.  From October 2002 to September 2003,
32.3 tonnes of fruit came off the block of which 57% was weighed on the
Mobile Card.  Monthly production during this period averaged 2.7 tonnes. 
• Phases 1 and 2 were almost cleared and ready for replanting. 
• By August 2003 all outstanding debt had been repaid. 
• In August 2003 a new wheelbarrow, harvesting pole and sickle were
purchased on credit. 
• In September 2003 an order had been placed for seedlings for Phases 1 and
2 and a management plan had been developed to poison Phase 3 once
Phases 1 and 2 were back in production. 
 
For Elizabeth, the socio-economic benefits of the Mobile Card have been
substantial.  Her monthly income improved greatly since employing Mobile Card
labour.  The Mobile Card enabled her to gain greater long-term income security.
This has helped her to plan a future where she is less dependent on her
neighbours.  For example, Elizabeth’s new goal is to save money to build a
permanent house on her block, a goal that is now attainable with the increased
production from the deployment of Mobile Card labour.   
 
 




Father - Son 
Kapore LSS block 
 
 
Block details: 6 hectares of oil palm. 
1st Phase: planted 1968; replanted in 1984. 
2nd Phase: planted 1969; replanted in 1996. 
3rd Phase: planted 1980. 
 
Mobile Card contract signed in September, 2002, and work began in October 
2002. 
 
The leaseholder, Tom, left the block in April 2002 to work for a Malaysian 
logging company in Kikori, Gulf Province.  His wife, three sons and young 
daughter remained on the block.  The second-born son works in Kimbe, the 
third-born son recently completed Year 12 at Hoskins Secondary School, and the 
daughter attends primary school.  The first-born son, David, is the only son 
married, and he resides on the block with his wife and three children.  His wife 
is employed by NBPOL.  An unrelated family is living temporarily on the block 
while they save money for their fares to their home province of Madang.  This 
family (husband, wife and eight children) were invited to take up residence on 
the block after the husband became unemployed and lost his employer-provided 
housing.  These ‘guests’ regularly help out with work on the block for which 
they receive a small income.  
 
Prior to Tom’s departure to Gulf Province, it was arranged that David take over 
the management of oil palm work on the block.  David was given his father’s 
ATM bank card so that he could access oil palm income deposited directly into 
his father’s bank account each month.  However, a few months after his father 
left, the ATM card was damaged and David could not withdraw money from the 
account.  With his father away David was unable to obtain a new ATM card 
from the bank.  Without access to the income from oil palm the motivation to 
produce oil palm declined sharply.  
 
In September, with his mother’s consent, a Mobile Card was issued to David as a 
temporary measure to address the income problems on the block.  The family 
agreed that there should be some financial gain for the father, so the percentage 
split was set at 80:20 in favour of David.  The family on the block would live on 
the 80% that David earned with the 20% paid into Tom’s account to remain there 
until his return in January 2003.  It was hoped that the funds accumulating in 
Tom’s bank account through this forced saving would be used to pay school fees 
on Tom’s return.  With the assistance of OPIC, a bank account was opened in  
 - 36 -  
Box 2 cont… 
 
David’s name for him to receive the 80% share of the oil palm income. 
 
During the father’s absence the Mobile Card was effective in maintaining and 
increasing production.  In the three months prior to the introduction of the card, 
production was 9.3% above the average for an LSS block, but rose to 36% above 
the average for the three months from October to December 2002, when the 
Mobile Card was in operation.  While this block’s productivity increased further 
after the Mobile Card’s introduction, the more substantial gain was the 
prevention of a collapse in production when block residents were unable to 
access oil palm income from their father’s bank account. 
 
When the Mobile Card was in use David organised the labour for harvesting 
FFB, and his mother and young sister continued to collect loose fruit which they 
weighed on the Mama Card.  The mother, Ellen, received some help from the 
female visitors living on the block.  David cut most of the bunches during 
harvesting with occasional help from his young brother who was mainly 
responsible for carting and stacking the fruit at the roadside collection point.  
Occasionally, when additional labour was required during harvesting, David 
would call on male members of the guest family on the block.  He would pay 
them small amounts of cash for their work.   
 
When Tom returned to the block in January 2003 he was surprised to learn how 
much money had accumulated in his bank account; he had expected that that 
most of it would have been spent on living expenses during his absence.  Some 
of the money in his bank account was used to pay school fees as the rest of the 
family had hoped.   
 
On his return Tom cancelled the Mobile Card for three reasons.  First, he said he 
did not understand the full implications of the new payment system for himself 
and the rest of the family, i.e., more control of the block’s income placed in the 
hands of his son, David.  While Tom agreed that the Mobile Card had been a 
successful innovation during his absence and solved a particular problem on the 
block, he was unsure how the Card would operate now that he had returned and 
was back in charge of the block.  He recognised that in the past there had been 
disputes over his allocation of harvesting rounds and his distribution of oil palm 
income amongst his sons, which sometimes had disrupted the supply of family 
labour.  He could not see how the Mobile Card could reduce the incidence of 
these disputes, so the easiest option at the time of his return was to cancel the 
Mobile Card.   
 
His second reason for cancelling the Mobile Card was that the 80% split in 
favour of the Mobile Card meant that sometimes there was not enough fruit 
being weighed on the Papa Card to cover monthly loan repayments, which  
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Box 2 cont… 
 
meant that the balance had to be deducted from Mama Card payments.  Both 
Tom and Ellen were unhappy with this arrangement.  Third, David’s younger 
brother complained to Tom that David was not paying them fairly for their 
labour.   
 
However, six months later in June 2003 after reflecting on the issue and 
weighing up the pros and cons of the Mobile Card, Tom signed a new contract 
with his son, David.  There was some negotiation over the percentage split: 
originally Tom argued for an 80:20 split in his own favour, but David protested 
and they agreed to a 70:30 split in favour of Tom.  With this split, Tom 
maintained his dominant position in income distribution and hence his control 
over block management.   
 
The Mobile Card provided many socio-economic benefits for both father and 
son.  It gave David a measure of financial independence because he no longer 
relied on his father, Tom, to make cash payments to him based on what Tom 
viewed as fair and reasonable for his son’s labour.  Further, by having his share 
of oil palm income paid into his bank account, David believed it was much 
easier for him to save money than when he was paid in cash by his father.  The 
bank account has given him more control over his finances and enabled him to 
plan for the future, which he sees as especially important because he has family 
responsibilities as a husband and father.  David believes that the Mobile Card 
has increased his motivation to work on the block as he recognises that the more 
he works, the higher his income.  This is an issue for many second generation 
settlers; their father’s control over the level and frequency of payment for oil 
palm work is the basis of many disputes, and is often a disincentive to providing 
labour.  
 
Finally, Tom saw how the Mobile Card could lead to a reduction in conflicts over 
work allocation and remuneration on the block.  An attempt to resolve conflict 
several years ago, involved the family moving from the wok bung production 
strategy to the markim mun rotation strategy where each month the oil palm 
work and income were rotated amongst co-resident households.  While partly 
successful at reducing the level and frequency of conflict, a few problems 
persisted, mainly because the sons were dissatisfied at the relatively long 
periods between their allocated months.   
 
The Mobile Card allowed a more flexible payment system to emerge which 
enabled block residents more frequent access to oil palm income, and therefore 
lessened levels of conflict even further.  For instance, in July 2003, David and his 
brother Andrew harvested Phase 3 and most of Phase 2, while the rest of the 
family harvested Phase 1 and part of Phase 2.  The following month, the family 
used the wok bung strategy for Phases 1, 2 and 3, with all the FFB being weighed  
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Box 2 cont… 
 
on the Mobile Card.  While David performed the largest share of the work and 
received 30% of the income, other family members who contributed labour were 
paid from Tom’s 70% share of the income.  Tom’s wife and daughter continued 
to use the Mama Card.  By enabling more flexible labour and payment strategies 
to emerge on this block, the Mobile Card led to fewer incidences of social 
conflict, and higher productivity on what was already an above average 
performing block.  
 
 




Leaseholder – Hired Labourer 




Total Area: 6.0ha. 
1st Phase: replanted 1982. 
2nd phase: replanted 1997. 
3rd phase: replanted 2000. 
 
Kapo is the first-born son of the original leaseholder who migrated from the 
Highlands in the early 1970s to settle on the block.  Kapo’s father and mother are 
deceased and he resides on the block with his wife, Lucy, and their two young 
children.  His younger brother, Peter, and his family, and two nephews also live 
on the block.  There are 12 people in total residing on the block. 
 
Kapo has a long-term medical condition that limits the amount of work he can 
do on the block.  In 1991, and again in 2001, he was operated on for a hernia, and 
the doctor advised him to avoid heavy work that would aggravate his condition.  
This meant that he was unable to do the heavier work on the block such as the 
cutting, lifting and wheel barrowing of FFB.  With the help of his wife, Lucy, 
Kapo confines his oil palm work to harvesting the young palms in Phase 3 at the 
rear of the block.  
 
When Kapo was discharged from hospital in 2001 and returned to the block, he 
managed Phase 3 while his two brothers, Peter and Luke (who also lived on the 
block), harvested the taller palms in Phases 1 and 2.  Occasionally, Kapo would 
also call on his in-laws for additional harvesting labour.  Following a period of 
prolonged conflict amongst the three brothers, which often disrupted harvesting, 
Kapo evicted Luke from the block.  Kapo then applied to OPIC to join the Mobile 
Card trial as a means to assist his brother Peter with the harvesting of the taller 
palms in Phases 1 and 2.  He arranged with OPIC for his old friend Mauru to be 
issued with a Mobile Card.  Mauru, who lived nearby on his parent’s block with 
11 brothers and sisters was pleased with this arrangement, because he could 
look forward to a regular and secure income which would also relieve some of 
the economic pressure on his own family’s highly populated block.   
 
Mauru’s parents took up a lease on a Kapore block at the same time as Kapo’s 
parents.  Mauru who was born and raised on the block was considered to be a 
hard worker, and Kapo thought he would be the ideal person to work for him 
under a Mobile Card arrangement.  Kapo was keen to sign a long-term contract 
with Mauru so that he would be guaranteed a labour supply for each harvest  
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round.  Kapo also liked the convenience of the payment arrangement whereby 
the company would pay Mauru directly.  This meant that Kapo would not have 
to retain a portion of his monthly oil palm income to pay labour and he would 
not need to travel into town every payday to withdraw cash from the bank to 
pay labour.   
 
At the end of September 2002 a six-month Mobile Card contract was signed with 
Mauru, with a 70:30 split in favour of Kapo.  Tragically, Mauru died in 
December of an un-diagnosed illness.  For the two months he worked as a 
Mobile Card worker, production was 63% higher than the LSS average for that 
period compared with 6% below the LSS average for the previous nine months.  
During his time as a Mobile Card worker on Kapo’s block, Mauru worked 
alongside Kapo’s brother, Peter.   
 
In January 2003, Kapo signed a new six-month contract with Bela, his brother-in-
law.  Bela did not have his own block and until 2001 he and his wife, Jella, had 
been living on Jella’s overcrowded parents’ block at Kavui.  In 2001, when the 
social and economic pressures on Jella’s parents’ block became too much, they 
moved to Kimbe to live with relatives in one of the informal settlements.  
However, they found it very difficult to earn an income in Kimbe, and 
recognised that they would be unable to afford the school fees for their children.  
Bela also wanted to return to the Highlands with his family, and could not see a 
way to save the fares while they lived in Kimbe.  Bela approached his sister and 
Kapo for permission for his family to move on to their block.  Kapo agreed and 
arranged for Bela to be issued with a Mobile Card.   
 
The Mobile Card contract worked well for three months until Bela’s wife, Jella, 
was accused of misusing property belonging to Kapo and Lucy.  Bela and Jella 
were asked to leave the block.  During the three months that Bela worked on the 
block, Kapo and Lucy continued working together on Phase 3, and the Mama 
Card was used to weigh loose fruit from all three phases.  Bela harvested Phases 
1 and 2, and he often sought the help of his brother to harvest oil palm bunches.  
Working together, Bela and his brother could complete the harvesting in two 
days.  Bela’s young son often wheel barrowed FFB to the roadside and stacked it 
in nets ready for collection.  Owing to Kapo’s ongoing disputes with his brother, 
Peter found harvesting work on another block.   
 
In the four months following the cancellation of the Mobile Card, production on 
Kapo’s block dropped markedly from 57% above the LSS average when Bela 
was using the Mobile Card to 16% below the average.  The fall in productivity 
cannot be attributed solely to the loss of hired labour when Bela was sacked; 
some of Kapo’s harvesting tools were stolen; there was a death in Lucy’s family  
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on a neighbouring block; and, Kapo’s brother, Peter, continued to cause trouble 
on the block which disrupted harvesting.   
 
In August, Kapo contacted OPIC to sign a third contract with a long-term friend, 
Ben.  A six-month contract was negotiated with a 70:30 split in Kapo’s favour.  
Ben had recently completed a six-month Mobile Card contract on another block 
and was looking for work.  In the remaining two months of the trial when Ben 
was employed as a Mobile Card worker, production increased to 75% above the 
average production for an LSS block during that period.   
 
Overall, production on Kapo’s block increased from 5% below the average 
productivity of an LSS block to 76% above the average in months when Mobile 
Card workers were employed.   
 
One of the key features of this case was the commitment of the blockholder to 
the concept of the Mobile Card.  When the concept was explained to him, Kapo 
immediately saw the advantages for himself and his family of employing Mobile 
Card labour.  On several other blocks in the trial, blockholders had difficulty 
conceptualising the gains to be made.  It was only after a month or two of 
employing a Mobile Card worker, that the income benefits to blockholders 
became evident to them, and their commitment to the concept increased.  In 
Kapo’s case, given his health condition which limited his work capacity, and his 
ongoing conflicts with his brothers, the Mobile Card provided a solution to a 
long-term labour supply problem.  
 





Kapore LSS block 
 
 
Block details: 6 hectares of oil palm. 
1st Phase: planted 1968; replanted in 1985. 
2nd Phase: planted 1969; replanted in 1996. 
3rd Phase: planted in 1982. 
 
The leaseholder, Vincent, died in 1992.  Following his death, his wife and 
children returned to Popondetta, and Vincent’s brother, Leopold, remained on 
the block as caretaker.  Leopold is not married and has no dependents living 
with him.  He lived alone on the block until 2001/2002 but moved to a 
neighbouring block owned by an elderly unmarried man, Anton, after being 
threatened by some Kapore youth.  Anton’s brother and his family, including 
Anton’s brother’s married daughter, Margaret, and her family also reside on the 
block.   
 
Over the years Margaret’s husband, Henry, had occasionally helped Leopold 
harvest his block, and in 2002 when Leopold was hospitalised for three months 
with tuberculosis, Henry carried out all the harvesting and maintenance work on 
Leopold’s block.  When Leopold returned to the block he was too weak to do 
heavy work and continued to rely on Henry for labour.  After hearing an OPIC 
radio extension program on the Mobile Card, Leopold contacted OPIC to sign a 
Mobile Card contract with Henry.  
 
The contract was signed in June 2003, with a percentage split of 60:40 in favour 
of Leopold.  Leopold’s interest in the Mobile Card was threefold.  First, he 
wanted to formalise the work arrangement with Henry because he was very 
satisfied with his work.  Second, the Mobile Card provided a convenient and 
easy mechanism to pay hired labour, and also guaranteed himself an income.  
Third, since his illness, Leopold no longer had the strength or will to remain 
working on his brother’s block, and desired to return permanently to 
Popondetta to be with his family (he plans to settle on a family oil palm block at 
Sorovi LSS).  Leopold planned to visit Popondetta in early 2004 to discuss with 
his family the sale of the Kapore block and his return home.  He planned to be in 
Popondetta for several months.  In his absence the Mobile Card was to be used 
to maintain production and guarantee an income stream for himself and Henry. 
 
From June to October 2003, when the Mobile Card trial finished, the card was 
used four times.  The extension officer supervising the trial reported that block  
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maintenance was excellent and that a very trusting relationship had developed 
between Leopold and Henry.  There is every indication that the Mobile Card will 
work successfully in Leopold’s absence.   
 
For Leopold, the Mobile Card was facilitating his move out of the industry at 
Hoskins.  Production is being maintained during this transition as he organises 
the sale of the block and plans his move home to Popondetta.   
 
 






Solutions Labour supply constraints are the primary cause of under-
harvesting and low smallholder productivity.  Constraints on the 
supply of labour lead to the under-utilisation of family or 
caretaker labour and the minimal supply of hired labour.  They 
are due to the reluctance of people to provide labour because of 
inadequate, uncertain or disputed remuneration of their labour.   
 
The primary objective of the Mobile Card initiative was to 
overcome labour supply constraints by guaranteeing payment of 
labour thereby removing payment uncertainty and reducing the 
incidence of disputes over labour remuneration.  The Card also 
aimed to ease income pressures arising from population growth 
and to address some of the consequences of an ageing settler 
population and broader socio-economic changes.  Of pressing 
concern is the rapid rate of population growth since 1990 which 
is leading to multiple, co-resident household blocks where oil 
palm income must be shared amongst larger numbers of people 
and households.  By providing additional off-block income 
through Mobile Card work, or by resolving disputes over labour 
remuneration within blocks the Mobile Card has eased social and 
income pressures.  
 
The Mobile Card initiative also helps in the growing problem of 
the reduced work capacity of an ageing population of 
blockholders.  For some elderly blockholders their success on the 
scheme has contributed to their predicament today.  Capitalising 
on the educational opportunities available on the LSS (which 
were often absent in their home areas), has meant these elderly 
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blockholders’ children have been successful in finding 
employment elsewhere.  Their success in raising and educating 
their children has, ironically, left them without labour they can 
draw on for harvesting and general block maintenance.  The 
absence of a market in hired labour limits their productivity and 
incomes.  The Mobile Card fixes this problem directly by 
improving their access to labour.   
 
Socio-economic and demographic change has also led to 
increasing numbers of caretaker blocks.  Some ageing growers 
and their families have retired to their home villages (the current 
interest in vanilla is facilitating this move), and have either 
appointed caretakers to manage their blocks or sold their blocks.  
The buyers of these leasehold blocks are often in full-time 
employment and their purchases are investments for their own 
retirement and/or to secure land for their children’s future.  
While they continue in full-time employment some have 
appointed caretakers for their blocks.  However, for a range of 
reasons outlined in Section 1, caretakers are often underpaid.  
The Mobile Card overcomes this problem for caretakers by 
providing them with a regular, predictable and secure income.   
 
Where to From 
Here? To build on the success of the Mobile Card trial the following 
recommendations are proposed for the Hoskins scheme: 
 
1. Adjust the company smallholder payroll system to 
accommodate Mobile Card payments to workers and 
blockholders.   
2. Ensure that the initiative remains highly flexible and 
responsive to smallholders’ production needs.  It is the 
flexibility and responsiveness of the Mobile Card 
payment system that will determine the level of success 
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of the initiative.  Ideally it should be possible for Mobile 
Card contracts to be drawn up at short notice for a single 
harvest round, specifying the phase or phases to be 
harvested. 
3. Promote and extend the Mobile Card initiative to all 
subdivisions, with initial emphasis on caretaker blocks 
and labour-short blocks. 
4. Investigate options for bringing in harvesting teams 
employed on Mobile Card contracts to VOP areas where 
productivity is consistently low.  As a starting point, it 
would be useful to investigate the potential of employing 
village youth, sporting or church groups as Mobile Card 
teams.  If village groups are unable to harvest the crop 
fully, it might be worth investigating the potential of 
employing youth from overpopulated LSS blocks, though 
great care would need to be taken to ensure such 
initiatives were supported and partly managed by senior 
and respected people in the village.  This would need to 
be handled sensitively, and it would be highly desirable 
that Mobile Card labour be brought in only on harvesting 
days, and compelled to leave at the end of each working 
day.  This initiative should begin with two or three VOP 
growers employing a small number of Mobile card 
workers.  Once these VOP blockholders and their 
neighbours begin to see the financial rewards for 
themselves from employing Mobile Card labour, many 
more may be anticipated to join the scheme.  It would 
probably be cost-effective for the company to transport 
workers in and out each day. 
5. Church and school-owned blocks with low oil palm 
productivity should be encouraged to recruit Mobile Card 
labour.  The feasibility of older schoolchildren (or their 
relatives) paying school fees in this way should be 
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examined, particularly for children from highly populated 
blocks where income is limited. 
6. Sporting clubs, church groups and schools should have 
access to Mobile Cards for fund raising.  This would 
strengthen the community, while creating an awareness 
amongst the smallholder population that the oil palm 
industry is an integral part of their community life. 
7. Growers and Mobile Card workers should be permitted to 
use the Papa and Mobile cards to arrange the split of 
harvested fruit, if they so wish (see Box 1).  This would 
mean creating a 100% option split on the Mobile Card 
paid to the worker.   
8. Ensure fruit pickup schedules facilitate employment of 
Mobile Card labour.  It is little use recruiting Mobile 
Card workers for harvesting when their own blocks must 
be harvested the same week. 
9. Where feasible, fertiliser application should be promoted 
on blocks where Mobile Card labour is being deployed to 
raise harvesting rates.  Given that a significant number of 
growers regularly under-harvest (Section 1), income 
gains from fertiliser may be marginal or negative for 
many growers (Koczberski & Curry 2003: 79-84; 112-
113).  The income benefits from fertiliser are much more 
likely to be realised where full-harvesting is occurring 
following the introduction of Mobile Card labour. 
10. Consideration should be given to including the Mobile 
Card as part of a replanting package for heavily populated 
blocks.  For some multiple household blocks undertaking 
replanting, it may be useful to provide a Mobile Card so 
that they can earn income by harvesting other blocks 
while they wait for their new palms to come into 
production.  The Card would help overcome the severe 
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financial pressures on populated blocks following palm 
poisoning.   
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NOTES 
 
1. Because of large variations in observers’ estimates of the 
quantities of fruit not harvested, the categories “fully 
harvested”, “partially harvested” and “not harvested” 
were adopted.  In the oil palm industry, a six-hectare oil 
palm block is divided into three, two-hectare phases.  
Phase 1 is closest to the fruit collection point.  Each phase 
is usually planted at different times.   
 
2. In November 2002, OPIC-Bialla recorded the numbers of 
extra nets put out for collection by smallholders when the 
fruit collection truck was one or more days later than the 
scheduled pickup day (Koczberski and Curry 2003: 55-
56).  Across the three subdivisions surveyed, late pickups 
resulted in an increase in production of 36%.  The most 
significant increase of 57% was in the older LSS 
subdivision of Wilelo where there were many elderly 
growers and where delayed replanting had resulted in 
large areas of very tall palms.  Delayed pickups allowed 
more time for harvesting. 
 
3. ‘Purchase’ blocks are oil palm blocks on customary land 
which are ‘owned’ by non-clan members, usually 
migrants from other provinces of PNG.  Anecdotal 
evidence from OPIC suggests that ‘purchase’ blocks have 
higher productivity than VOP blocks owned by 
customary landowners. 
 
4. Estimates of the quantities of lost fruit came from a 
subsample of the broader harvesting survey at Hoskins, in 
which the authors were accompanied by experienced 
senior extension officers.   
 
5. In 2000, the mean population per LSS block at Hoskins 
was 13.3, while Bialla LSS blocks in 2002 had a mean 
population per block of 11.1. 
 
6. Some labourers and blockholders had difficulty 
understanding the percentage split.  This revealed the 
importance of providing realistic assessments of the 
income that workers and blockholders could expect to 
earn from Mobile Card labour.   
 
7. Pseudonyms have been used in Boxes 1-4 for reasons of 
informant confidentiality.   
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